What happened to Kraden.com?

Background on Kraden.com

Kraden.com was the official website of Kraden, a purportedly secure, end-to-end encrypted messaging application launched in 2022. The service was operated by a Swiss-registered company Dragon Secure GmbH, which described its purpose as software development of apps and messengers.​

Kraden was marketed as a privacy-focused messenger (with features like zero-knowledge architecture and no data retention) and was even recommended in privacy communities as a highly secure communication tool​

However, Kraden’s user base and true purpose have come under scrutiny: U.S. authorities found that this platform was intimately linked to an international criminal network, casting doubt on any legitimate use. In fact, investigators note there is “no evidence that Kraden was ever used for legitimate purposes”, alleging it functioned chiefly as a covert communications hub for drug traffickers​

Inclusion on OFAC Sanctions List (December 2024)

On December 17, 2024, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a sweeping counter-narcotics sanctions action targeting a global drug trafficking ring. OFAC designated 12 individuals and 8 entities across seven countries under Executive Order 14059 (an order aimed at combatting foreign narcotics traffickers)​.

Among the entities sanctioned was Dragon Secure GmbH – listed with the aliases “Kraden” and “Skyda” – which operates the Kraden encrypted messaging app.​

According to the Treasury, Dragon Secure (Kraden) was added to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) sanctions list for being owned or controlled by a sanctioned drug kingpin​.

The OFAC listing explicitly includes “www.kraden.com” as the company’s website, which is why Kraden.com now appears on the U.S. sanctions list.​

In practical terms, this designation means Kraden.com and its operator are “blocked” under U.S. law – effectively blacklisting the site and associated business. The Federal Register notice for these sanctions confirms Dragon Secure GmbH (“Kraden”) was designated for its ties to illicit drug activities and lists Kraden.com as an identifier for the blocked entity​.

Reason for Sanction – Links to Illicit Trafficking

Kraden was sanctioned due to its role in facilitating international drug trafficking operations. U.S. officials determined that the Kraden app was being used as an encrypted communications platform by narcotics traffickers to coordinate illicit drug shipments​.

In particular, OFAC tied Kraden to a Lithuania-linked drug smuggling syndicate. The majority owner of Dragon Secure (Kraden’s parent firm) is Rokas Karpavicius (also known as Rokas Karpis), a Lithuanian national with a notorious history in the drug trade.

Karpavicius had previously been convicted for running a global drug and money laundering scheme and was paroled in 2016, but authorities allege he continued orchestrating cocaine and methamphetamine trafficking on multiple continents.​

Under his direction, the Kraden platform became a tool for covert communication among cartel operatives. As OFAC’s press release states, Dragon Secure “operates the ‘Kraden’ encrypted messaging application, which has been used by drug traffickers”.​

Karpavicius’s criminal network includes other sanctioned figures: Virginijus Labutis, identified as his right-hand man, and Arnas Grinevicius, a tech associate who helped run the Kraden operation​.

Labutis and Grinevicius were also designated by OFAC – Labutis for co-running the trafficking ring, and Grinevicius for serving as a leader/official of Dragon Secure (Kraden)​.

Executive Order 14059 was invoked to sanction these individuals and entities for “having engaged in, or attempted to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to the international proliferation of illicit drugs”.​

In short, Kraden.com earned its place on the sanctions list because it was an integral part of an illicit narcotics enterprise (according to the US Home Treasury): the platform’s encrypted messaging capabilities were allegedly harnessed to organize drug shipments and launder proceeds in a secure manner, under the stewardship of known drug traffickers​.

Official Statements from U.S. Treasury and Agencies

The U.S. Department of the Treasury has publicly outlined the reasons for Kraden’s blacklisting. In the December 17, 2024 press release announcing the sanctions, Treasury officials highlighted the goal of disrupting “the financial networks that enable the illicit drug trade”​.

Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Bradley T. Smith, noted that drug trafficking organizations rely on global webs of facilitators, and vowed that the U.S. will continue to target those networks​.

Specifically regarding Kraden, the Treasury’s statement directly called out Dragon Secure for operating an encrypted app used by traffickers​.

This official allegation makes clear that U.S. authorities viewed Kraden not as an ordinary messaging service, but as crimeware supporting transnational drug smuggling.

OFAC’s announcement, coordinated with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and international partners, underscored the seriousness of the case​.

. Treasury’s release credited collaboration with the DEA and foreign law enforcement in Lithuania, Colombia, New Zealand and elsewhere for uncovering the network behind Kraden​

. The inclusion of Kraden’s website on the sanctions list was further detailed in an OFAC notice and the Federal Register, identifying “DRAGON SECURE GMBH (a.k.a. ‘KRADEN’)” at a Swiss address with the website **www.kraden.com**​:contentReference[oaicite:24]{index=24}.

 

In an official Notice of OFAC Sanctions Action, the rationale for Kraden’s listing is given as its ownership/control by Karpavicius, who himself meets the criteria of E.O. 14059 due to major drug trafficking activities​

. The Treasury Department explicitly links Kraden to the drug syndicate’s communications: by sanctioning the app’s operators, Treasury signaled that even encrypted communication tools will be targeted when they facilitate organized crime.

 

Kraden.com’s Operations and Involvement in Illicit Activity

Kraden’s history and operations reveal a nexus with organized crime. Dragon Secure GmbH, the company behind Kraden, was established in Switzerland in March 2022​.

Its leadership included individuals with both tech roles and criminal backgrounds. The firm’s CEO/majority owner, Rokas Karpavicius (alias Rokas Karpis), set up Kraden after rebranding himself as a businessman post-prison​.

. Under the guise of a tech startup building secure messengers, he reportedly created Kraden as a closed network for confidential communications. Its features – strong encryption, peer-to-peer messaging, no SMS verification – appealed not just to privacy-conscious users but also to underworld clientele.

According to investigative reporting and U.S. allegations, Kraden was adopted by drug traffickers as a trusted channel. Law enforcement intelligence observed the app being used to coordinate multi-national cocaine shipments​.

. The very ownership of Kraden by Karpavicius’s Dragon Secure suggests it may have been developed with illicit intent; one media report bluntly noted “there is no evidence that Kraden was ever used for legitimate purposes”.​

. In other words, the platform’s primary users were likely members of narcotics rings seeking secure, deniable communications. This mirrors the pattern seen with other black-market encrypted phone networks (such as Phantom Secure or Sky Global) that catered to criminal organizations. Indeed, U.S. authorities concluded that Kraden functioned as part of Karpavicius’s drug trafficking infrastructure – effectively a digital tool to evade law enforcement while coordinating crimes​.

It’s worth noting that not all of Kraden’s public-facing operations were overtly illicit. The app had a website (Kraden.com), social media presence, and was publicly touted for its security. Cybersecurity enthusiasts even conducted bounty audits on Kraden’s software, claiming they found no critical vulnerabilities​.

. This indicates the service maintained a veneer of legitimacy and technical robustness. However, behind this facade, Kraden’s client base and management intentions raised red flags. The U.S. Treasury’s designation came after accumulating evidence that Kraden’s encrypted network was knowingly being used to facilitate serious crimes, tying the platform to money laundering, bribery, and global narcotics smuggling activities spearheaded by its owners​.

Enforcement Actions and Website Removal

Significant enforcement actions have been taken against Kraden.com’s operators, leading to the website’s removal. The OFAC sanctions themselves are a powerful enforcement tool: as of December 17, 2024, all property and interests of Dragon Secure/Kraden under U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, and U.S. persons are prohibited from any dealings with them.​

. In practical terms, this means any U.S.-based domain registrars, hosting services, or financial intermediaries had to cut off services to Kraden.com. Shortly after the sanctions were announced, the Kraden.com site became inaccessible (effectively taken down), which is likely a direct consequence of its blacklisted status. Once an entity is on the SDN list, companies worldwide often err on the side of caution and sever relationships, to avoid sanctions violations. Kraden.com’s removal from the internet ecosystem thus aligns with the sanctions enforcement, ensuring the platform cannot continue operating openly. 

Meanwhile, law enforcement actions against individuals involved have been underway in parallel. Prior to the U.S. sanctions, Virginijus Labutis – one of the key figures in the Kraden network – was arrested in October 2024 in Colombia on an Interpol Red Notice and extradited to Lithuania on drug trafficking charges​.        

His arrest, coordinated with the broader investigation, signaled the net closing around the group. Rokas Karpavicius, identified as the kingpin, was reported to be residing in Spain; his exact legal status post-sanction is unclear, but he is now internationally shunned and under scrutiny​.

Another associate, Arnas Grinevicius, who helped run the Kraden platform, was named in the U.S. sanctions but has not been publicly reported as arrested to date. The U.S. Treasury’s action also targeted affiliates like Jurga Karpe (Karpavicius’s partner) and others who managed related front companies, freezing them out of the financial system​.

The sanctions against Kraden and its operators carry legal force: anyone (U.S. or foreign) who knowingly facilitates transactions for them could face penalties.​

This effectively dismantles Kraden’s viability as a business. An official Treasury statement emphasized that “all property and interests in property” of the designated persons in U.S. reach are now blocked, and that U.S. (and even unwitting non-U.S.) parties can face severe penalties for violating these prohibitions​.

The blacklisting of Kraden’s domain and company serves both to isolate the traffickers and to send a warning. As one news outlet summarized, U.S. authorities alleged Kraden was a trafficker tool and accordingly blacklisted the company and its affiliates in the 2024 sanctions.​

It’s important to note that OFAC sanctions are a civil economic measure, not a criminal indictment. However, they often accompany or precede criminal investigations. In the Kraden case, the sanctions were the public’s first notice of the platform’s takedown, but they were the result of a long-running probe (involving the DEA, Lithuanian Criminal Police, Colombian prosecutors, and others). This international investigation (nicknamed Operation “Edge-Dale” in some reports) revealed the extent of the group’s activities and provided evidence justifying the sanctions​.

The removal of Kraden.com can thus be seen as the culmination of these efforts – effectively enforcing a shutdown of the communication channel that had been enabling a major drug syndicate.

Updates and Aftermath

• In early 2025, multiple news sources and government records have elaborated on Kraden’s downfall and its inclusion on the sanctions list. The New Zealand Herald, for example, reported on the U.S. action, noting that Dragon Secure GmbH “operates Kraden, an encrypted messaging application which has been used by drug traffickers”​
• New Zealand police officials lauded the sanctions, pointing out it was the first OFAC designation involving individuals with a New Zealand nexus, and affirmed that no matter where such criminals base themselves, they are not out of reach of law enforcement​
• Investigative journalists from OCCRP and Lithuania’s Siena.lt uncovered that Karpavicius (under the name “Rokas Karpis”) had founded Kraden’s parent company after his release from prison, and they traced how the platform fit into his renewed smuggling schemes​
• These reports provided context that the Kraden app was essentially a covert enterprise embedded within a drug cartel network, rather than a mainstream tech product.
• By March 2025, media in Lithuania and international outlets continued to explore the story. A Lithuanian news analysis highlighted the country’s startling role in this global narcotics case and reiterated that U.S. sanctions singled out Kraden as a tool of traffickers​
• The Federal Register published the formal notice of OFAC’s actions, publicly naming Kraden/Dragon Secure and the related persons with their identifiers (addresses, websites, etc.) as sanctioned entities​
• Additionally, the U.S. Treasury’s online Sanctions Search tool now flags “Kraden” and Kraden.com as hits, confirming the domain’s presence on the SDN list​
• These updates reinforce the narrative that Kraden.com was removed due to its sanctioning for involvement in illicit activities, and they provide transparency about who and what were targeted.
• No public announcements have been made about any U.S. criminal indictment of Kraden’s operators so far, but the sanctions often indicate that further law enforcement action could follow if those individuals are ever within U.S. reach. For now, the immediate consequence is that Kraden.com remains offline and its operators financially frozen, while international authorities continue to investigate the broader drug trafficking conspiracy. The Kraden case serves as a clear example of U.S. agencies using sanctions to swiftly neutralize a cyber-enabled threat (an encrypted criminal communications platform) even as traditional prosecutions are ongoing.

Summary of Key Findings

• Kraden.com was the website of “Kraden,” an encrypted messaging app launched in 2022 by Swiss company Dragon Secure GmbH
• Marketed as a secure, privacy-first communication tool, it in fact became a secret channel for organized crime.
• OFAC Sanction Listing: On Dec. 17, 2024, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Kraden’s operator under Executive Order 14059, which targets foreign narcotics traffickers​
• Dragon Secure GmbH (aka “Kraden”) was added to the SDN sanctions list, with Kraden.com explicitly noted as its website​
• This is why Kraden.com now appears on OFAC’s sanctions list – it is an alias/asset of a designated entity.
• Reason for Sanctions: U.S. authorities determined that Kraden was used to facilitate international drug trafficking. The app was operated by Rokas Karpavicius (Rokas Karpis), a convicted drug smuggler, and was utilized by his network to coordinate cocaine and methamphetamine shipments worldwide​
• Treasury officials stated that the “Kraden” encrypted messaging service was being used by drug traffickers, leading to its blacklisting​
• Related Entities/Individuals: Alongside Kraden (Dragon Secure GmbH), OFAC sanctioned Karpavicius and his associates. Karpavicius was designated for his role as a global narcotics trafficker​
• Arnas Grinevicius, a Lithuanian IT specialist who helped run Kraden, was sanctioned for acting as a leader of the company​
• Virginijus Labutis, Karpavicius’s partner in crime, was also designated and had already been arrested on drug charges in late 2024​
• These designations reflect the belief that Kraden/Dragon Secure was owned or controlled by traffickers and used in their illicit operations​
• Official Statements: The U.S. Department of the Treasury, in its press release, emphasized disrupting the **“global web” of drug trafficking infrastructure​
• OFAC’s announcement, coordinated with the DEA and international partners, highlighted Kraden’s sanction as part of a broader strategy to combat the synthetic drug threat​
• Previous Operations: Kraden presented itself as a legitimate secure messaging app (even tech blogs praised its encryption), but evidence indicates it was largely a front for illicit use​
• The company behind it was formed by known criminals, and no substantial legitimate user base or business operations have been documented. This suggests Kraden’s primary purpose was to serve covert criminal communication needs.
• Enforcement Actions: In addition to financial sanctions, law enforcement took action against Kraden’s operators. Labutis’s arrest in 2024 was one such enforcement step​
• Karpavicius remains under investigation and on the run (reported in Spain), now hampered by sanctions. All of Kraden/Dragon Secure’s assets in U.S. reach are frozen, and U.S. businesses must cease any services to it​. Violating these sanctions can lead to civil or criminal penalties​.
• Website Removal: Following the sanctions, Kraden.com was effectively removed/offline. Being on the OFAC SDN list made it illegal for domain registrars, hosting providers, or payment processors with U.S. ties to support the site​
• As a result, the site was taken down and the app’s distribution channels disrupted. The sanctions “blacklisted the company and its affiliates”, ending Kraden’s operations on the open web​
• Continued Monitoring: Government records (Federal Register, OFAC notices) and news updates confirm that Kraden.com’s removal is directly linked to its sanctioning for illicit activity​
• The case remains a developing international investigation, but the immediate threat – an encrypted crime-friendly platform – has been nullified by the joint enforcement efforts.

Sources: The above information is drawn from official U.S. Treasury statements and notices, including the December 17, 2024 OFAC press release and sanctions list entries, as well as reporting from reputable news outlets (New Zealand Herald, OCCRP) that have examined the Kraden case in detail​

These sources provide a consistent picture of Kraden.com’s role in an illicit trafficking scheme and the reasons behind its sanctioning and removal.